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Tonalities of Literature 
in Transition
The World of the End of the World, 
or Marcelo Cohen’s El oído absoluto
P A T R I C K D O V E
Indiana University, Bloomington
IN A WELL-KNOWN FORMULATION, FREDRIC JAMESON CHARACTERIZES POST-
modernity as an epochal shift coinciding with the tendential colonization
of the planet by transnational capital. The postmodern is what ensues when
even those territories previously considered to lie beyond the reach of mar-
ket forces—that is, especially, nature and the unconscious—are found to
have been assimilated into the calculating rationale of exchange and use.
Such a world-historical transformation poses considerable difficulties for
critical thinking in its endeavor to think the contingency of the present-day
dominant regime of signification. One of the attendant effects of the hege-
monic ascent of neoliberalism around the globe is that resistance to capi-
tal becomes difficult or impossible to define. In its relentless colonization
of peripheral zones, capital appears to have succeeded in divesting itself of
any identifiable—and hence finite—point of origin. Its agency is every-
where in general, and thus it emanates from nowhere in particular. Working
in sync with the seeming defeat or exhaustion of all existing alternatives to
free-market capitalism, the logic of the market also works to ensure that
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any conceivable alternative to the market could only come into view at the
expense of its own legibility.
The market today is a site of subreption in which a particular way of
configuring meaning acts to conceal or efface the contingent nature of its
own origin, dressing itself in the trappings of a natural, spontaneous order
or an inevitable outcome. Perhaps the most obvious example is the teleo-
logical account of the free market put forth by thinkers such as Francis
Fukuyama and Alejandro Foxley, in which the transition to free-market
economies around the globe signals the evolutionary triumph of a “natural”
order over other mediated (and hence unnatural or fallen) means of organ-
izing socioeconomic relations. The nature of what I am terming “subreption”
is to project the sense that “it just happens,” and that “it” therefore cannot
and ought not be contested. But, in this sense, how does the hegemonic
emergence of the current global regime differ from those of other moments
in the history of hegemonic articulations? Do not all hegemonic procedures
come to pass when a certain particular manages more or less successfully to
pass itself off as a universal? Perhaps the key difference between the domi-
nant discourse of the present moment and those of other periods must be
sought in the specificity of erasures being enacted today. The disappearance
of ideological antagonism around the globe, together with the widely pro-
claimed “end” of a certain conception of history, coincides with the emer-
gence of “consensus” as the new truth or telos of all politics. Whatever
parallels it may evoke, “consensus” is not just another name for the univer-
sal status claimed by all hegemons. Under the rhetoric of consensus, the
conception of politics as praxis, as an open-ended venture that transforms
the agent together with its field, is supplanted by an administrative realm in
which no signifier—or rather, no gap between signifiers—could conceivably
emerge to challenge the universality of the dominant discourse. Consensus
is the ideologeme of the end of ideology itself.
The implications of this tectonic shift are especially difficult to unravel
in a region such as Latin America’s Southern Cone, where the triumphant
arrival of neoliberalism is not easy to separate—chronologically or onto-
logically—from recent histories of military dictatorship. In Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, the term “transition” in fact applies to two 
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historical events: the transition from dictatorship to democracy coincides
with the substitution of state economy by market economy. The postula-
tion of a necessary or unavoidable link between these two transformations
—to the extent that “democracy” comes to be seen as essentially synony-
mous with its liberal and neoliberal articulations—would seem to represent
the inauguration of a new epoch for politics and for thinking. Transition
thus names a sweeping reorganization of economic and political society
characterized by, among other things, the wholesale privatization of the
state. Just as profoundly, however, transition names an ontological trans-
formation that affects what is felt to be conceivable and open to debate—
in short, it affects the very horizons for thinking today. Transition in the
Southern Cone is at least partially subject to Jean-François Lyotard’s assess-
ment of postmodernity as a rupture in the “grand narratives” that provided
the structuring principle for modern societies (Lyotard 1984). I am propos-
ing “rupture” as a diagnostic term since it is not necessarily the belief in
and desire for totalizing metanarratives necessarily that cease, but rather
that the desire for this ontological ground cannot fully separate itself from
a disavowal of its own underlying condition.1 According to the legitimating
and celebratory views of the transition, the prevailing meaning of history
today is that we are living out the end of history. The final meaning of his-
tory is its own calcification qua historicity. Viewed from the perspective of
values-oriented critiques of the transition, on the other hand, the hege-
monic definition of transition is invariably seen as the onset of crisis.
Synonymous with both the destruction of society’s collective bearings and
the imposition of a new sense of direction, globalizing transition is a
methodical disarticulation of these collectives themselves (Bourdieu 1998,
3; as quoted in Moreiras 2001, 268).2
This paper will approach the question of transition from several angles.
While I am concerned with concrete problems that arise during the period
I am calling “transitional,” I am also interested in exploring the notion of
“transition” as a discursive (literary and theoretical) construct whose aims
are not necessarily limited to the description of extradiscursive processes. In
this latter sense, “transition” reflects two related endeavors: for one, an
attempt to name an event whose consequences have perhaps not yet been
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sufficiently registered and theorized, and at the same time, an endeavor to
intervene in the scene it describes and alter prevailing understandings of
history, the social, and even literature itself. My use of the term “transition”
is therefore marked by an unresolved tension between constative and per-
formative tendencies. It is my position that the distinction just made
between the “concrete” and the “discursive” in fact describes a relation and
not a simple opposition. While these two dimensions should not be
conflated, neither should they be viewed in an unreflected way as compris-
ing entirely separate fields. In the first part of this paper, I will suggest that
the notion of transition from dictatorship to democracy is haunted today by
the lingering problem of how to render justice for the crimes committed
under military dictatorship. Indeed, recent history in the Southern Cone
would seem to testify not only to the exigency of justice but also to what I
will call its impossibility. This aporetic impasse at the heart of justice will
frame the first part of my discussion. Then, the discussion will turn to Martin
Heidegger’s meditations on mood and historicity. I will suggest that the
problems attending transition in the Southern Cone present new challenges
for any real attempt to think historically today. With Heidegger, I argue that
“mood” affords a unique possibility for thinking today. The last section of
this paper offers a reading of El oído absoluto, a 1987 novel by the Argentine
writer Marcelo Cohen, which I use to advance a notion of “counter-founda-
tional” writing as an attempt to mark or experience the limits of the hege-
monic discourse of the transition.
S T A T E T E R R O R I S M A N D T H E
A P O R I A S O F J U S T I C E
Under military rule, the state’s systematic use of terrorism to annihilate
political opposition is seen retrospectively to have paved the way for the
final and total consolidation of neoliberalism—understood as the ideology
of the end of ideological conflict—during the transition period. Yet, insofar
as historiographical analysis seeks to pinpoint the origin of the neoliberal
hegemony, it also renders itself partially blind to the paradoxically latent
temporality of the present situation. To see how this is the case, let us turn
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briefly to the problem of justice as it has taken shape in post-dictatorship
Southern Cone societies.
The reestablishment of representative democracy in the Southern Cone
during the 1980s and 1990s is accompanied by popular calls for redress of
crimes committed under military rule. The transitional regimes pragmati-
cally sought to satisfy or dissolve these demands through various institu-
tional channels (including the enactment of amnesty laws, the convening of
truth commissions, and in some cases trials for military criminals followed
by official pardons), in ways that also allow them to maintain the tacit sup-
port of the military. Needless to say, these pragmatic measures were regarded
by many of the victims, their families, and supporters as inadequate
responses to crimes that often bordered on the unimaginable. The wide gap
between popular demands for justice and the measured institutional
responses leads in many cases to an intensification of debates and conflicts
over how to address the recent past and its inordinate history of terror. In
the view of those who continue to demand justice, in defining justice exclu-
sively as an administrative matter, the state shows itself to be less concerned
with pursuing justice, and more committed to the goal of advancing insti-
tutionality as a corrective measure for a fragmented and disjointed society.
Patricio Aylwin, the democratically elected successor to Pinochet in
Chile, articulated such a pragmatic prescription for administrative justice
about which there is much to say. In his first address to the nation as presi-
dent on 11 March 1990, Aylwin linked a successful transition to the aim of
“justicia en la medida de lo posible” [literally, justice in the measure that it
is possible]. Perhaps even more than its Argentine, Brazilian, and Uruguayan
counterparts, the Aylwin regime was faced with the threat of a strong mili-
tary which, after nearly two decades of authoritarian rule, still enjoyed the
support of powerful sectors in Chilean society. Aylwin’s self-defined task was
thus to do whatever necessary to ensure that the military would not return
to intervene again, even if this meant ceding to the latter’s demands for
impunity from the prosecution. In his inaugural address announcing the
return of democracy following nearly two decades of military dictatorship,
Aylwin defined the present and future horizon of justice as a symbolic inter-
vention undertaken by the state, the true aim of which is to restore the
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smooth functioning of what Lacan calls “the symbolic.” Institutional justice
is determined in the time of post-dictatorship as the calculus of adequatio,
as an act that conforms to and secures the being of the actual. But what is
the nature of this actual configuration of things? And what exactly is the
relation between “symbolic intervention” and the constitution of “the sym-
bolic” itself? I will return to these questions after first discussing in more
detail how the problem of justice makes itself heard in Southern Cone post-
dictatorship societies.
An irony attends the calculative reason exemplified by Aylwin’s address.
The truly disastrous effect of state terror is not to be found in the magni-
tude of the specific crimes committed by the state, as if those transgressions
were simply “worse” or “greater” than other crimes committed in different
contexts. If that were the case, the issue of justice would hinge only on
finding or deciding as to the proper measure for each particular crime per-
petrated by the state. Aylwin’s prescription notwithstanding (he calls for jus-
tice “en la medida de lo posible”), the problem of justice here is not reducible
to a matter of measuring or calculating. The cumulative effects of state ter-
ror, seen as the suspension of the distinction between life and death, are felt
by many to have precisely exceeded—and thereby abolished—all possibility
of measure.3
Returning to Aylwin’s address, let us note that the naming of what is pos-
sible—and also, silently but unavoidably, what is not possible or what lies
outside the realm of debate—can never, especially when comes it from the
mouth of a president, be said to attain the neutrality of a purely descriptive
statement. In defining in advance and according to necessity (“en la medida
de lo posible”) the extent to which justice can be pursued, the calculating rea-
son of the transition has the effect of consolidating and naturalizing the par-
ticular economic, political, and social configuration under which it issues.
“Given that these are the conditions in which we find ourselves, let us act
accordingly”: while it would seem that the conditional clause in this edict
merely “describes” what kind of justice can reasonably be expected today, the
main clause cannot avoid altering the conditional description by conferring
legitimacy on the order it claims to summarize. What presents itself as a
mere description in fact continues the work of a powerful mechanism of
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reinscription, in which the contingent and violent origins of the present state
of affairs are silently erased and rewritten as the unavoidable and neces-
sary—and hence rational—nature of the real. In this phrase, ought is silently
collapsed back into what is. The phrase “en la medida de lo posible” not only
prescribes the degree to which justice is possible today, it also purports to
describe the future: it presages what can be expected of the democratic soci-
ety to come, and at the same time it defines the very future of justice itself.
It offers the reassuring story that we act thus out of necessity, because things
are as they are and because we cannot (or can no longer) remember that once
things might have turned out differently. In this sense, transition enacts a
refusal of the real, a foreclosure that would expel any trace of antagonism
and contingency, or what is “out of joint,” from the arena of public discourse.
A considerable array of difficulties thus accompany any attempt to think
transition in the Southern Cone. Post-dictatorship societies of the Southern
Cone are marked by a disjunction between two historical moments, a dis-
jointure that makes its appearance as the failure or refusal in one time to
symbolize an excess of the other.4
The point I would like to emphasize here is not that administrative jus-
tice turns out to be no justice at all—though, judging from the cases in ques-
tion, that is often the case. Instead, I am suggesting that the establishing of
a necessary link between institutionality and justice, or the designation of
institutional space as the sole proper and legitimate space for pursuing the
question of justice, effectively suspends any and all debate over how “justice”
should be defined and to what extent pursued. In the end, the securing of
this link risks annulling the very possibility of justice by precisely—and par-
adoxically—refusing to acknowledge the impossibility that haunts every
thought of justice. It amounts to a refusal of all that remains undecidable in
relation to justice, and it likewise entails a number of important conse-
quences for how we conceive of democracy and politics.
We can begin to elaborate this notion of the impossibility of justice by
turning briefly to Jacques Derrida’s exposition on justice and deconstruction
in his essay “Force of Law” (Derrida 1992). Derrida suggests that justice con-
stitutes a theoretical-practical aporia: it names an experience of undecid-
ability, or a boundary that we cannot traverse without exposing ourselves to
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the possibility of contradiction, error, and unjust decisions. One of Derrida’s
ways of describing this aporia is by demonstrating that the thought of jus-
tice is marked by a constitutive incompatibility between the universal and
the singular. On one hand, justice necessarily lays claim to general and uni-
versal applicability: in order to be considered just, a ruling or law must apply
equally to all. In Derrida’s terms, it must be iterable, or repeatable, citable,
and knowable by all. However, justice cannot be accomplished through a cal-
culated or mechanical application of rules. It necessarily addresses itself to
particular cases in their singular character. But the aporia of which Derrida
speaks is not a simple contradiction between general truths and particular
demands. Rather, it stems from the fact that justice must not pause over this
impasse; it can neither be content to deliberate endlessly over impossible
decisions, nor can it know in advance that the decision it undertakes will
result in a good end. Justice is invoked with uncompromising exigency; it
calls for a decision for which we are always unprepared, but which must be
undertaken now.
One can also describe the question of justice as marked aporetically by
a heterogeneous temporality. For Derrida, no act or decision can claim to
have implemented justice at any given moment in time. A given decision
either has yet to be founded and accepted as a shared and just measure, or
it is dependent on an already institutionalized rule that may or may not be
just. And if the just nature of this earlier model could somehow be guaran-
teed (and Derrida would, of course, argue that this cannot be done), the
dependent decision would then become a merely mechanical, calculating
application. For Derrida, justice is always “à venir”: its possibility belongs
both to the instant of the decision and to the decision’s future, and this co-
belonging precisely prevents us from knowing the origin of the decision and
its destination at the same time. And so the future of justice is in fact also
its impossibility: “l’à venir” is not only a future time that might someday be
realizable as present time, but also the chance or opening in the present (in
but not belonging to it, as would a possession or essence) that gives the
thought and hope of a future. “L’à venir” names a future that will be, as all
futures must, fundamentally different from the present (but who can say
how or why?) rather than a mere reproduction of the same. That there “is” a
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future or that we “have” a future: futurity names the sheer fact that one can
say this today, but without deceiving ourselves into thinking that the status
of this future can be explained in terms of being or presence. Justice, then,
is marked by an aporetic incompatibility between two notions of time and
futurity. On one hand, a future-present which we must construct, shape or
realize in a just manner (but what manner is that? who decides?). If our
future is to have any chance of being just, we cannot merely await its arrival
passively, but must be able to see our own hand in its arrival. On the other
hand, the pure possibility of an other time, a temporal différence which is
always already retreating from our view any time the future is determined as
a specific future-present. If the future as future-present can be understood
in terms of calculation and labor, the future as chance or possibility poses a
limit for all calculation.
The administrative reason of the transition effectively relinquishes and
silences the question of justice, I maintain, because it reduces what are in
fact the constitutive aporias of justice I have just described to an array of
contingent, phenomenal obstacles (the military, the international banking
community, etc.) which prevent its full realization for the foreseeable future.
By the same token, this rationality presents what is in fact a contingent cir-
cumstance (the fact that there would seem to be no existing alternatives to
free-market capitalism) as a necessary development that can no longer be
altered (neoliberalism as the end of history).
P H I L O S O P H I C A L C R I T I Q U E A N D T H E D A R K E N I N G
O F T H E W O R L D :  H I S T O R I C I T Y A S A T T U N E M E N T
What becomes of post-Kantian philosophical thinking in the wake of the
epochal transformations just described? Can such thinking respond to the
specific challenges of the time of transition in the Southern Cone, in which
proclamations of the end of history are superimposed over still-open or
newly reopened wounds? Ever since Archimedes, it has been a principle of
Western thinking that any substantive transformation of the world must
begin by postulating the existence of a vantage point from which the world
can be interpreted as a totality. The possibility of thinking something on the
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order of a world presupposes thinking’s capacity to posit for itself an out-
side, a locus external to the world from which the world could be made to
come into view as a whole. This transcendental site of world-historical
thinking has taken on various names in the history of the West: the Platonic
Good, the God of Judeo-Christian tradition, the humanistic idea of Man,
Enlightenment notions of progress and emancipation, as well as more recent
reference points such as the People, Patria, and Party. Lyotard’s account of
postmodernism as “rupture” implies the collapse of this constitutive out-
side, and thus signals the withdrawal of any ontological ground from which
to think—and thereby transform—the world as a whole.
A world never allows itself to be opened and then stuck back together begin-
ning from a multitude of perceived objects reassembled after the fact; rather,
it is that which in advance is most originally and inherently manifest, within
which alone such and such a thing may come to meet us. The world’s open-
ing movement comes about in the fundamental mood [Grundstimmung]. The
power to transport, integrate, and thus open, that a fundamental mood pos-
sesses is therefore a power to found, for it places Dasein upon its foundations
facing its abysses. (Heidegger 1976, 140–41, as quoted in Haar 1992, 163)
Martin Heidegger would seem to have anticipated the problem described
by Lyotard when he suggests at the beginning of Being and Time that think-
ing, in its effort to gain access to being, cannot separate itself from the par-
ticular historical determination of being in which any such thinking finds
itself. That “we always already move about in an understanding of being”
means that thinking, in asking about the being of beings, can find no
approach to its object that is not already compromised by a certain tilt,
marked by the predetermined and unquestioned understanding of being
that shapes any given time and place (Heidegger 1962, 25). There is no neu-
tral outside in which thinking could take refuge while attempting to arrive
at an “objective” or “disinterested” knowledge of being. Thinking itself con-
tinually reproduces this silent predetermination whenever and wherever it
thinks. And thus we only gain a tentative and insufficient grasp of the pres-
ent crisis when we represent it to ourselves using the resources of histori-
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cism—for instance, when we locate the emergence of this crisis within a
diachronic sequence that begins with the nation-state and ends with the
market. The belief in such a chronological evolution or regression is but a
symptom of the silent determination of being that gives shape to the ideo-
logical constellation of modernity and postmodernity.
But the fact that thinking can never gain access to the world “as it truly
is” does not mean that we can have no experience of the world as such.
Whenever and wherever deliberation happens, thinking has already been
exposed to what Being and Time terms the “facticity” of a world. World in this
sense has little to do with how the planet is conceived by the technological
view, i.e., as the sum of objects that can be calculated and consumed. Indeed,
insofar as technicity takes presence and utility as its basis for thinking every-
thing and anything, it precisely refuses the possibility of experiencing the ori-
gin of world in its facticity. Facticity affects and solicits beings prior to any
determination of identity or essence. While Heidegger insists that the under-
standing repeatedly fails to grasp the disclosure that silently shapes every
configuration of meaning, he names “mood” [Stimmung] as the register in
which we first gain some awareness of the facticity of world (see Haar 1992).
Certain emotions, Heidegger says, can prompt us to withdraw and step back
from our routinized and calculating ways of relating to the world. Our every-
day concerns, whose self-evident importance we ordinarily regard as beyond
question, are arrested by the experience of anxiety, which is tantamount to
the subject losing its footing in the world. This sudden separation from the
everyday in turn clears the way for us to experience existence as enigma, as
something irretrievably anterior to the world as it is apprehended by calcula-
tive reason. Mood registers what Heidegger terms the “factical totality” of
being, or the manner in which being is given to us before thinking can assume
a position of judgment over it. The experience of anteriority brings us to the
awareness that there is no way into being, and that neither is there any way
out; thinking cannot gain the distance it seeks in order fully to grasp, through
affirmation or negation, what is both prior to and irreducible to its resources.
Thinking cannot think its own origin in the world.
In his later work, Heidegger comes to view particular moods as belong-
ing in a specific way to a given epoch in the history of being. Thinking finds
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itself always already to have been “attuned” [bestimmt] to being in specific
ways, prepared or tuned in by the “voice” [Stimme] of being itself. Certain dis-
positions seem to belong characteristically to a particular time and place and
its specific way of experiencing being. Thus, the quasi-ahistorical Stimmung of
which Heidegger speaks in Being and Time becomes Bestimmung, the deter-
mination of a particular epochal tone, climate, or appointment. For instance,
speechless astonishment before the sheer fact of being constitutes a funda-
mental attunement for Greek thinking, whereas hyperbolic doubt (and its
eventual calculated conversion into certainty) sets the prevailing tone for the
modern, rationalist tradition. And finally, as the epoch of metaphysics comes
to a close, terror attests to the panic that arises in the withdrawal of all onto-
logical ground. In calling attention to the importance of history for
Bestimmung, we should bear in mind that Heidegger’s analysis is not a his-
toricist treatment of mood. The question of epochal specificity remains enig-
matic to us insofar as our analysis of it cannot step out of its own location in
history—nor can it ever fully assume this location as its own proper site, since
it is always already dislocated through its indebtedness to mood.
The account of attunement as receptivity to the anteriority of being (or
facticity) takes on an added depth in Heidegger’s later work, where it helps
set the stage for a clarification of the historicity of being (see in particular
Heidegger 1999). If mood attests to the radical anteriority of world, and if it
is also necessarily aligned with a given epoch and its particular mode of expe-
riencing being, mood in its specificity furthermore participates in constitut-
ing a given epoch. The Greek experience of being is not just reflected in
speechless astonishment; it is this wonder that gives rise to a specific way of
asking questions about the world. Mood as hearing is also attunement as first
orientation; the interruption of the everyday that is prompted by anxiety is
also—perhaps—the first step in opening up a new path for thinking. In order
to see why this is the case, we must keep in mind that for Heidegger, being
does not name a transcendental substance or subject that is simply and
always already “there.” Rather, we must superimpose over the anteriority of
being the thought that finite being must always be brought forth anew by
human hands—even as being itself provides the pseudo-transcendental
determination or truth of beings. Being only is when and where there is a 
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historical project underway; being names the distinctive manner in which a
project is born, lives, and dies. And so what we could call, for lack of a better
term, the “passive” meaning of mood—as mark of the irretrievable anterior-
ity of being—is already inscribed by a kind of “activity” or re-mark. The effect
or the mark participates in bringing about its own cause as projected being.
Heidegger suggests that the exact tenor of thinking’s attunement is wont
to fluctuate, both from one epoch to another and within any given epoch
itself. The sense of astonishment that defined the Greek experience of the
world is no longer central to our own history and its way of questioning.
Wonder is supplanted by doubt, and doubt in turn by certainty, and cer-
tainty finally by terror. At the same time, a new danger begins to show itself
with the exhaustion of metaphysical system-thinking: technicity finds itself
virtually alone in the world today. We no longer have recourse to “God,”
“Reason,” “Man,” or any other transcendental point of reference that could
mediate and mark the limits of the technological representation of the
world. The unchecked spread of technological immanentism introduces a
new species of intonation into the world today: a vague, nearly accentless
mood which Heidegger terms the “distress of the absence of distress.” Self-
assured and unquestioning, this flattened-out tone attests to a world that
has already been mapped and measured in its entirety. This disposition is
unable to open to an experience of the world and its happening as anything
other than self-evident. The postulated end of the technological representa-
tion of the world is the reduction and anaesthetization of all mood. From
this point of view, terror is not in fact the fundamental, grounding attune-
ment of the postmetaphysical age. The predominant sense of our increas-
ingly technified world is what Heidegger calls “distress,” a malignant
disposition that is always already mutating into its opposite: self-assured
effervescence as the complete absence of distress.
T R A N S I T I O N A N D T H E L I T E R A R Y
L I M I T S O F S I G N I F I C A T I O N
I will now approach the questions of post-dictatorship and transition from a
different angle, by addressing the status of mood and affect in contemporary
P a t r i c k  D o v e ● 251
CR4-2 08  12/03/04  12:12 PM  Page 251
Southern Cone prose. What follows is a reading of Marcelo Cohen’s 1987
novel El oído absoluto. The notion of using literature as a point of departure
for reflecting on world-historical questions may have a somewhat anachro-
nistic ring to it today, especially in a Latin American context. Such a project
may seem better suited to the cultural modernism of the “Boom” era than to
a time when literary criticism has apparently ceded its privileged position as
interpreter of symbolic production to cultural studies. However, it is pre-
cisely the belated and disjointed nature of this link between literary aes-
thetics, history, and politics that is of interest to me here. Two lines of
questioning will shape this reading of Cohen’s text. The first suggests that we
have reached the end of a certain influential way of understanding literature
in Latin America, while the second argues that the exhaustion of this tradi-
tion is also—perhaps—an opening onto a new way of thinking about and
experiencing the literary.
On one hand, the prominence of “mood” as a topos in recent Southern
Cone novels suggests the need for a broad reassessment of how we under-
stand literature today: of its status as an index of cultural production, as well
as its possibilities and its limitations as a critical force in contemporary soci-
ety.5 In many of these texts, the emergence of mood as an important literary
topos often coincides with “negative” experiences—including disorientation,
depression, shock, apathy, and numbness—that challenge traditional views
of representation. Paraphrasing Freud’s view of anxiety, we could say that
these instances of literary affect are like warning signals pointing to an event
that one feels to be imminent, and yet fails to take place—or has yet to be
registered within a system of symbolic values and equivalencies. Mood as
affect, however, does not necessarily function in these texts as an index of an
extraliterary crisis; its presence also potentially serves notice of a metaliter-
ary problem, one that affects literature’s capacity to refer to its own situation.
The specific way in which mood and affect emerge in these texts suggests
that we have arrived at a crisis stage in literary modernity, a point at which
literature is no longer able to situate itself in relation to tradition—and, for
modern Latin American literature, this is to say that it no longer finds its
supplementary support in the concept or the promise of the nation-state.
Following Alberto Moreiras’s analysis of the relation between literature, 
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culture, and the state in Latin America, let us call this crisis the demise of
the culturalist concept of literature (Moreiras 2001).
If mood and affect at times point to a crisis of cultural foundations in
post-dictatorship writing, these topoi also give shape in certain works to a
reflection on this absence of ground as such. It is this reflection that will pro-
vide a point of departure for thinking what remains of the literary—or what
emerges there for the first time—following the collapse of its culturalist
ground. Certain post-dictatorship texts suggest a radicalized understanding
of the literary aesthetic, in which the interruption of traditional forms of
signification (metaphor, symbol, allegory) helps to engender a sensation of
the sublime, of the existence of the unpresentable. Or, better yet, it attests to
a conviction that existence itself marks a limit for representation. The dif-
ference between this and traditional literary references to the sublime is that
here, the marking of the limits of the imagination does not culminate in an
incitation of reason—or literature—to take us beyond these limits, but
rather signals a proscription (of what—if anything—could be said to lie
beyond these limits) and a falling back.
Of course, the two lines of questioning I am describing do not constitute
a total description of contemporary literary production in the Southern Cone,
nor do the developments I am attempting to theorize rule out the presence of
other tendencies, including attempts to salvage or reinvent some form of cul-
tural-ontological ground for the literary. Indeed, I believe it would be more
precise to say that literary attempts to reflect on the absence of ground on one
hand, and endeavors to recuperate or reinvent some sort of ground (albeit in
a form that literature knows to be purely tropological) on the other are at
work simultaneously or co-intermittently in many of these texts.6
The setting of Cohen’s novel is Lorelei, a mythical city-state presumably
located somewhere in Latin America. While its administrators promote
this locale as another example of Latin America’s long history of utopian
and developmentalist projects, the text in fact encourages us to see it as the
instance of a relatively new phenomenon. Unlike traditional utopian proj-
ects, which always bore a necessary relation to nature as first ground, this
is a world that has been entirely produced. Here nature has been reduced
conceptually to a sum of commodities ready to be consumed. Even more
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drastically, nature, as the substance upon which culture is traditionally
thought to build, here turns out to have been fabricated by culture itself. To
fill in the gaps in what Max Weber describes as modernity’s utterly disen-
chanted nature, the designers of Lorelei have erected the “Columna Fraterna”
[Fraternal Column], a laser tower that functions as colossal writing machine.
The column inscribes the heavens with mediatized accounts of both the busi-
ness of the city and the myriad conflicts and disasters that plague the world
outside of Lorelei. This mediatic inscription process yields a pair of comple-
mentary images: a smoothly functioning “inside” in juxtaposition to a
conflictive, embattled “outside.” This is a simulated production process which
serves to mask the fact that, in the technified world of Lorelei, the outside is
no longer conceivable as alterity. That is, the identity of the outside turns out
to be nothing more and nothing less than the specular double of the inside.
The imaginary projection of the outside as the barbarous “other,” replete with
violence, antagonism, etc., lends support to a complementary image of an
internal, proper space whose dissimulated fabrication would be synonymous
with security, tranquillity, and universal accord. The unchanging climate of
Lorelei is dedicated to the ceaseless reproduction of this sameness, of self-
certainty and technological security as the self-evident ends of all social
activity. At the same time, this production process also necessitates the
repression of whatever threatens to disrupt the vast mediatic mirror that
reconfirms this world to and for itself.7 Cohen’s text offers an allegorical
vision of Latin American modernity, revealing a perhaps unsuspected con-
nection between the history of utopian thinking about the nation-state that
begins with the generation of Bello, Echevarría, and Sarmiento, and the post-
utopian epoch in which the political is increasingly redefined as administra-
tive order of bureaucratic navigation. What at first appears as a simple
contradiction (Lorelei is not the utopia its architects claim; it is in fact a
dystopia) turns out to be a reflected form of identity. Through its endless
refraction and dissimulation of images, the text slowly leads us to identify the
grain of dystopia that was already at work in the utopian project itself. In a
word, both the utopian tradition and its post-utopian simulacrum can be
understood as consequences of the same silent determination of truth in
terms of self-production or machination.
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Cohen’s novel resonates with a number of different literary traditions,
including the utopian novel, science fiction, the detective novel, and the lit-
erature of exile. At the same time, one can approach the work with consid-
erably less attention to plot content, reading as if the text were a collection
of images, anecdotes, and aphorisms. One important anecdotal layer con-
cerns a dazzling theory of music proposed by one of the principal charac-
ters, Lotario. According to his thesis, the origin of musical sense—or
“musicality”—is to be found in what he terms acordes [chords or accords].
As aesthetic experience, music functions as a kind of universal memory, or
as “la presencia de lo perdido” [the presence of what has been lost] (292).
This paradoxical presence of absence is secured in the playing out of a dif-
ferential sequence of musical units or chords, which Lotario tellingly likens
to moods. When all is said and done, the succession of chords—insofar as it
is found to be harmonious—will have been an accord: that is, it produces the
feeling of a whole, of a unified work that exceeds the sum of its parts.
Creo que todos tenemos algo de la materia de la música. . . . El temperamento
mismo está hecho de acordes. Cada acorde es un estado de ánimo, y uno
unido a otro . . . forman el carácter de una persona. . . . Pero un acorde . . . es
un conjunto armónico de notas. Do menor es do más mi bemol más sol, y
por eso no puede definirse con un solo adjetivo. Y a mí me parece que con
los sentimientos pasa lo mismo. (134)
[I believe that we all have something of musical material within ourselves. . . .
Our very nature is made up of chords. Every chord is a mood, and one linked
to another . . . form the character of a person. But a chord . . . is also an
accord, a harmonic conjunction of notes. C-minor is C plus E-flat plus G, and
therefore it can’t be defined with any single adjective. It seems to me that it’s
the same way with feelings.]
As we see, each unit or chord is itself a harmonious assemblage of notes.
Harmony arises not simply from the richness and plenitude of a particular
combination, but from a kind of materiality that retreats behind the emer-
gence of the melodious or the beautiful. A chord is not just a plurality of
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notes whose individual senses have been determined in advance. Rather, like
Saussure’s alphabet, it is a multiplicity of differences: the sense of each
note—re, for instance—is precisely the invisible and inaudible difference
that places it between, while also distinguishing it from, do and mi. Harmony
emerges from the gaps or absences that mutely recede before a particular
conjunction of notes. Music shows us that sense or harmony, when and if it
occurs, is either always already withdrawing or always yet to come.
Realismo es que una obra . . . cambie con cada grupo que la interpreta, con
cada persona que le escucha. Para mí es larga, para Fulano corta, para un vio-
linista acelerada, otro la ralentiza. . . . Siempre es la misma pieza, y siempre
distinta. . . . Y también mi vida es distinta ahora que ayer, aunque sea la
misma vida. (229)
[Realism means that a work . . . changes from one group of interpreters to
another, with each person who listens to it. For me it’s too long, for what’s his
name it’s too short, for a violinist it’s rapid, whereas someone else slows it
down. . . . Always the same piece, and yet always different. . . . In the same
way my life is not the same today as it was yesterday, although it continues
to be the same life.]
Somewhat surprisingly, Lotario also declares that music in fact consti-
tutes the only true realism. He does not mean that music is more adept than
other forms of art at imitating nature. To be sure, music imitates nothing.
Lotario’s judgment of music as the truth of realism derives from the old con-
viction that music has to do with presentation in its purest sense: the pres-
entation of presentation itself. Music provides a model, we could say, for
thinking the origin of sense. At the same time, the musical medium attests
to a tragic aspect of this process. The price that sound pays for becoming
audible is that it must resign itself to its inevitable duplication, dissipation,
and loss. In order to win the chance of a good hearing, music must relinquish
all guarantees and deliver itself over to repetition, to the ear of another,
which is in fact an echo chamber. In producing a work or a whole, music
allows what is contingent (different interpretations, different days) to form
an identity that appears necessary (the work, the life).
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As the title of the novel suggests, the physiology of the ear plays a cen-
tral role in this aesthetic theory. The eponymous “absolute ear” names a
magical ability to divine or to reproduce precisely any given tone or key. The
oído absoluto is an “inner ear” that remains immediately attuned to the voice
of being.9 Lotario, in recounting his musical ambitions, announces that he
wanted not just to possess such an inner ear, but actually to be this “germen
de la afinación universal” [germ of universal tuning or completion]. His wish
belongs to a certain understanding of art that prevails through much of
modernity; Lotario shares with this tradition an aesthetic imaginary for
which art would fill in the gaps and heal the fissures that arise through our
interactions with the real. Art incorporates the terrifying void into its own
mechanics—much like the physiological structure of the ear—and it thereby
provides a saving passage to solid ground. Or, using different terms, we could
say that aesthetic experience fashions a neutral space that would suture the
rifts and antagonisms of the social field. Variations on this theme can be
found not only in the cultural canons of the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries (see Lloyd and Thomas 1998), but also in more recent attempts to
counteract the violence of globalization through a return to culture and tra-
dition (see Moreiras 1999). In schematizing this aesthetic ideology, Cohen’s
text also allows us to see the points where its culturalist ground has begun
to waver. The point of Lotario’s self-undermining presentation is not that its
viewpoint is simply mistaken. This aesthetic ideology is highly aware that
what it refers to as the completion of a system (afinación) is in fact inhab-
ited by gaps, silences, and excesses. Perhaps the crucial difference that sep-
arates Cohen’s text from the culturalism that it mimics resides in the
question of how each aesthetic theory understands its respective relation to
its own limits. The system outlined by Lotario claims to interpret and regu-
late these lacks and surpluses through its own devices, representing them as
integral moments of rhythm and harmony. And thus the limits of the system
do not prevent the system from constituting itself as such.
On the other hand, we can also find in Cohen’s text a view of writing as
a counter-foundational practice. For Cohen, writing seeks out those
moments that precisely do not fit into—and that in fact interrupt and ruin—
the systematic production of harmonious wholes. “Hay momentos, si uno
los descubre, que son extraordinarias averías en la red eléctrica que nos 
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alimenta, y en el desconcierto que acuñan se puede atisbar la anticuada
audacia del vértigo” [There are moments, if one can discover them, that are
extraordinary breakdowns in the electronic network that sustains us. In the
disconcerting impression they impose on us, one can catch sight of the age-
old audacity of vertigo] (11). Let us then modify the Weberian account of
modernity alluded to above: technicity not only presides over the disen-
chantment of the world, it also unleashes a powerful operation of reinscrip-
tion that obscures the traces of its own machinations in the world.
Disenchantment is always already reenchantment through the projection of
self-evident certainty. Counter-foundational writing aims to reveal the gaps
that lie concealed beneath this projected semblance of a whole without gaps,
fissures, or conflict. In so doing, it would renew the possibility of experienc-
ing the origin or emergence of world as enigma. The difference between
these two aesthetic attitudes can be articulated as a shift in tonality, in
which afinación [attunement, completion] gives way to desconcierto [dis-
concertedness, uncertainty]. The distinction between these attitudes resides
not only in the distance between two distinct tonalities, but also amounts to
different understandings of tone itself. The nominal desconcierto evokes dis-
order, confusion, discord, agitation—all of which could be described as
symptoms of the times, of the feeling that things are going badly with the
world today. But in it we can also hear the transitive verb desconcertar
(to upset, to bewilder, to disconcert) and the reflexive verb desconcertarse
(to dislocate; to suffer a breakdown, as in a mechanism that no longer func-
tions), which might contain one of the names for the task of disruption that
counter-foundational literature sets for itself.
Some clarification is called for here as to the status of “tone” in what I
am describing as postculturalist, counter-foundational writing. First, we
cannot satisfactorily account for the matter of tone when we explain its
prominence in contemporary literature as a reflection of the times in which
we live; tonality is also a signifier that aims to intervene in the scene it helps
describe. Second, as the text suggests (to wit, “if one can discover them”),
these disjunctive figures and tonalities cannot be produced and orches-
trated in a calculating manner, either by an author, the work, or a reader.
These “moments,” which are of time but not necessarily of any specified
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duration, are constituted by relation, by the act of reading. To speak of
counter-foundational writing as I am doing is potentially misleading, then,
since the term risks creating a rigid conceptual opposition based on autho-
rial agency, opposing the intentions of Cohen to those of other writers
and/or of earlier generations. This is far from what I have in mind. My pur-
pose is to describe an epochal shift in how literature reads, a transformation
that compels us to call into question the very stability of the disciplinary
object known as “literature”—a change that is impossible to explain as the
exclusive function of a specific author, work, or reader.
Heidegger describes a paradox that complicates the manner in which we
can hope to relate to any fundamental attunement. A brief reference to this
difficulty will help to clarify what I am trying to suggest about the literary in
Cohen. On one hand, for reasons already outlined, fundamental attunement
can never become an object of knowledge: to recognize or become conscious
of it is already to have lost it. By the same token, fundamental attunement
cannot be made the end or objective of a subject’s will: there can be no pro-
duction of attunement where it does not already exist. Paradoxically, if we
wish to experience a fundamental attunement, we must seek it out where it
has already taken hold, and yet where it has not yet been aroused. Heidegger
thus resorts to “sleep” and “awakening” as a tropological couplet to describe
a possible relation to fundamental attunement:
‘Whatever is sleeping’ is in a peculiar way absent and yet there. When we awaken
an attunement, this means that it is already there. At the same time, it expresses
the fact that in a certain way it is not there. This is strange: attunement is some-
thing that is simultaneously there and not there. (Heidegger 1995, 60)
Neither presentation nor representation, consciousness nor uncon-
sciousness—nor any other philosopheme for that matter—would seem
capable of accounting for the relation between the thinking, representing,
acting subject and attunement. It is a matter of entering into relation with
something that is already there, but whose presence—or better, there-ness—
is also marked by absence, withdrawal, or deferral. It is a matter of inciting
what is always already there so that it can take place.
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The narrative structure of Cohen’s novel is marked by the intermittent
emergence and retreat of a number of distinct tonal registers. This multi-
plicity belies the idea that a particular time receives its configuration from
a single mood, or even from one general tendency or direction. Indeed, we
could take “tone” to refer precisely to the structure of variation, alternation,
and deferral at work in the textual determination of mood. Tone names not
a particular mood with a determinate meaning, but rather the internal vibra-
tion and differentiations within a given configuration (Fenves 1993). Topoi
such as “indebtedness,” “mourning,” and “perseverance” also point to key
emotional registers in this work. A thought of debt in particular helps to
strike a distinction between cultural modernity and post-dictatorship writ-
ing. As the narrator, Lino, describes it, “Me di cuenta de cuál era la bisagra
del delirio de Lotario. La música podía ser la famosa sustancia inencontra-
ble porque, como el zumbido de las moscas o los antojos del viento, no
pagaba deudas” [I discovered the basis of Lotario’s delirium: music could be
the famous ethereal substance because, like the buzzing of flies or the whim-
sies of the winds, music doesn’t pay debts] (293). Perhaps Lotario’s cultural-
ist ideology fails to settle its debts not because it prefers to ignore them, but
because these debts are in some sense incommensurable.10 For writing in the
wake of transition, on the other hand, what Lino elsewhere terms “esta
deuda angustiosa” [this anguished or oppressive debt] imposes a weight that
can neither be forgotten nor rendered habitual.
In his essay “Literature and the Right to Death” (1981), Maurice Blanchot
describes literature as bearing two “slopes” or contradictory inclinations.
The trope that mediates Blanchot’s topographical account of literature is
metonymy, a movement of displacement or slippage that yields repeated
doublings or bifurcations within a given literary text. I believe that
Blanchot’s model, if indeed it is one, can help to illuminate some of what is
at stake in Cohen’s novel. El oído absoluto, I am arguing, is fundamentally
concerned with the possibility or impossibility of a literary reflection on
what I described in the first section as societal transition. But we should not
therefore conclude too hastily that “transition” constitutes a stable, extralit-
erary point of reference for Cohen’s text. Such a reading would reinforce a
traditional concept of literature as mimesis.
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Let us recall Blanchot’s somewhat paradoxical claim that literature
begins when literature itself is called into question. Blanchot is suggesting
that literature ceaselessly brings us back to the fundamental instability of
language. Cohen’s novel offers a way of shedding more light on this seem-
ingly self-referential definition. The text seeks to win new space for reflect-
ing on the problem of transition by transposing what is ostensibly a problem
for history, politics, economics, sociology, and so on, into a literary problem.
El oído absoluto does not aestheticize the real, however. By “translating” the
question of transition into the realm of the literary, Cohen’s text accom-
plishes two things. First, it invites us to consider that what we so easily refer
to as “reality beyond literature” is in fact a point of reference that is already
mediated by processes akin to the mechanics of literary narration
(metonymy, metaphor, and so on). Second, this transposition unleashes a
destabilizing force that undermines what were once relatively stable sets of
meanings and values, such as those associated with “tradition,” “culture”—
and especially “literature” itself—in order to reveal these latter as having
been abandoned by their former ground. In other words, this “translation”
into literature suggests that transition can be understood in terms of the
Lacanian real. Cohen’s novel interrogates the concept of transition, seeking
the traces of a “remainder” that has yet to be acknowledged and registered
in the passage from dictatorship to democracy and from state to market—
and likewise asking after an “excess” that is produced and excluded as detri-
tus during these processes.
Literary language participates in the destabilizing process described above
by stripping concepts and structures of their self-evident standing. In narrat-
ing a story, literature necessarily does less—and more—than provide a faith-
ful reflection of the world as it truly is. The lack—or the excess—that literature
introduces into the world creates unsettling tremors in surrounding struc-
tures. Where once things stood in an accustomed, secure, and reassuring
arrangement, the world suddenly appears in a strange and troubling light.
According to Blanchot, literary language raises doubts about the veracity of
appearances as such. Literature provokes our suspicion that the language we
use on a daily basis is profoundly deceptive: language is in fact nothing more
than a set of naturalized conventions that obscure the way things truly are,
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while also artfully concealing from us its very artificiality. In the wake of this
exposure, we might imagine that literature promises to recuperate the “truth”
that is lost in the advent of representation. This promise constitutes one of the
two “slopes” of which Blanchot speaks. In its desire to break away from the
duplicity and false repose of ordinary words, literature endeavors to make
itself into a work of negation and death—or rather, it seeks to convert death
itself into a Work. While fully embracing its own negativity, literary discourse
also seeks to name and inaugurate a new world based on the promise of a
truth that would have freed itself of the falsity of appearances and illusion. The
literary imagination promises a world where value would no longer be in
decline. This, I repeat, describes only one of literature’s two faces.
In delving beneath the superficial veneer of words and appearances, lit-
erature also bears witness to a surprising discovery, which will constitute the
other “slope” in Blanchot’s account. It finds that mere appearances and
artifice do not in fact conceal anything of an ontologically positive nature,
and that there is thus nothing to hide. What representation in fact hides is
the reality that there is nothing to hide. With this startling discovery, which
amounts to a “scandal” of representation, literature suddenly finds itself on
the other “slope.” However, Blanchot’s analysis of this inclination, if followed
to its conclusion, does not lead us to nihilism. In the void that opens beneath
the superficiality of appearances, the literary gaze encounters the unex-
pected traces of being itself, a being that is already there prior to the dis-
tinction between truth and falsity. This gaze encounters being as its own
shadow, bereft of plenitude, refusing to relinquish itself to presentation, rev-
elation, or aletheia. This other slope serves as a conduit to what Blanchot
terms “the world of the end of the world.” It points to being as existence,
which thought can neither fully grasp nor elude.
At some point, Blanchot suggests, the two slopes must cross. If we follow
one far enough, we find ourselves in the other. By introducing negation and
death into the world, literature advances both the hope and the curse of the
world. The phrase that punctuates the essay, “death ends in being,” precisely
illustrates this idea. On one hand, “death ends in being” can be read as say-
ing that death culminates in being as its fruition, in the sense that the liter-
ary tradition has always sought to make a Work out of death. With death
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begins the afterlife of the symbol. At the same time, this phrase indicates
that language introduces death into the world as a corrosive force capable
of exposing the illusory nature of the ground literature seeks out. Language
thus immerses us in existence without any recourse or escape. Or, to put this
another way, the only way out, the only “end” to this history, is the collapse
of every way out.
Blanchot’s account suggests a tragic endeavor to present what presenta-
tion itself destroys.11 Perhaps the way to work through this seeming impasse
is to assume a tragic resolution, although this is not necessarily to say a
dialectical reconciliation. The tragic reading of Blanchot would amount to
this: We must not imagine that the truth or essence of literature lies on one
slope or the other. Nor, for that matter, can the division that appears where
these two slopes come together be glossed over through a series of self-
negating significations. On the contrary, we must think the one (let us say,
the literary affirmation of freedom and new beginning) starting with—and
not simply as the negation or dissimulation of—the other (the ineluctability
of bare existence, of being without being).
Is transition, along with its attendant risks, disjunctions, and possibili-
ties, properly speaking inside of or outside history? Where, when, and how
does whatever it is that transition names happen? These questions are as
much about problems of language and inscription as they are about politics
and history.12 The signifier “transition” names a site where thinking can take
place and indeed must find a way to take place. For, if real thinking did not
take place, there could be no real transition, but only an endless reproduc-
tion of the Same. As we have seen in the discussion of Heidegger, there can
be no thinking that does not always already presuppose a certain ground.
However, language’s capacity to refer to transition as a site for thinking can
never be fully guaranteed; if transition “is” anything, it is decidedly a being-
in-between, a being that is out of sorts with itself. As we live out the end of
system-thinking and the collapse of metanarratives, the semblance of stable,
solid ground continues to reproduce itself, albeit in spectral form, as the
story of the end of all history. The chance that thinking can find a gap within
this reproduction of the Same—and this is perhaps its only chance today—
rests upon its ability to begin to listen otherwise.
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Cohen’s text enacts a refusal of two possible approaches to our contem-
porary scene. For one thing, it rules out a cynical, nihilistic embrace of the
productionist representation of a world that has finally secured itself from
antagonism and uncertainty. It likewise rejects the reactive attempt to beat
back the incursion of globalized technicity through culturalist recourse to
tradition or high art. What is left in the wake of this literary deconstruction
of “transition” is an attempt to bring transition into view as an experience
of groundlessness. To paraphrase Paul Bové, it is a literary attempt to be of—
but not necessarily for—the time of globalization as “interregnum,” as expe-
rience of the suspension of the old signifying regimes together with an
opening onto something new—but what? For Cohen, literature can only
open itself to this vertiginous moment through what the text terms “perse-
verance.” Perseverance would call for resolve in the face of absolute destitu-
tion and darkening of the world, preparing itself for the incalculable leap of
beginning anew.

N O T E S
An earlier version of this article was presented at the 2001 Latin American Studies Association
Conference in Washington, D.C. I would like to thank Alberto Moreiras for his feedback on that
paper, and David Johnson for his helpful commentary during later revisions.
1. In view of the frequency with which Lyotard’s phrase has been reproduced, it is perhaps
time to ask whether the notion of “rupture,” and such epistemological corollaries as
“trauma” and “melancholia” do not themselves begin to function, albeit spectrally, as a
kind of ground or metanarrative.
2. In this essay, it is my aim both to acknowledge Bourdieu’s central concern about neolib-
eralism—namely, that as a political project it contains a concerted effort to destroy col-
lectivities—while also calling into question one commonly held critique of
“globalization,” which is often described (reductively, in my view) as a process of socie-
tal fragmentation. If one aspect of globality today entails the destruction of certain
social and ideological structures, it also presents us with another face that cannot in
my view be reduced to a concept of negation or destructuration. In what follows, I will
attempt to elaborate on this “other side” of globality, but without claiming any knowl-
edge about what kind of future might be taking shape therein.
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3. In addition to widespread restrictions on public life, detention without any legal
process, and torture, the terrorist methods of the dictatorship also entailed “disap-
pearing” those identified as opponents of the regime. The calculated effect of this strat-
egy was to sever the subject’s ties to community (the community of the living and of
the dead) by annihilating every trace of his or her existence.
4. According to many critics of the transition, the origins of this crisis of bearings in the
Southern Cone should be sought in the dictatorship period itself. Judging from the
large-scale privatization of formerly state-owned institutions in Argentina and Chile
that began under military rule in the 1970s and 1980s, the neoliberal hegemony can be
said to begin under dictatorship, and not with the relatively weak transitional regimes
which officially adopt free-market policies after the return to representative democracy.
In fact, neoliberalism could be said to have established itself in Chile as the “natural,”
“necessary,” or “inevitable” orientation of political and civil society a decade prior to its
ideological ascent in the United States and Great Britain under the Reagan and
Thatcher administrations. Shortly after deposing the democratically elected Socialist
government of Salvador Allende, the junta led by Augusto Pinochet turned over con-
trol of the Chilean economy to a group of technocrats who had received their training
with Milton Friedman at the University of Chicago.
5. In addition to Cohen, a few examples of literary texts in which consideration of dicta-
torship and transition is overtly framed by questions of mood are Saer (1980), Eltit
(1983), Soriano (1990), Piglia (1992), Mercado (1992), and Chejfec (1999).
6. This paper began to take shape as an imagined response to an article by Beatriz Sarlo
(1993) in which she discusses the increasing dominance of visual media in post-dicta-
torship society. Sarlo reads Cohen’s novel as an early diagnosis of the triumph of medi-
atized technicity in the Southern Cone. While I do not refer specifically to Sarlo’s text
here, I am interested in exploring some of the points she raises, in particular where the
issues of aesthetics, meaning, and technology both come together and seem to fly
apart. But I also seek to show why the alternatives proposed in her recent work, which
effectively pits the deconstruction of value against a return to cultural values, are ulti-
mately based on a false opposition. Sarlo’s complaint is that deconstruction, or the
attempt to think the limit of value-thinking, is fatally out of tune with the immediate
concerns faced by intellectuals in Latin America, for whom the vindication of cultural
value is a matter of intellectual life and death. I am suggesting, on the other hand, that
there cannot be one without the other. I will return to this point by way of conclusion,
where I take up a view of literature offered by Maurice Blanchot.
7. Perhaps the best example is the pulseras anticóleras, mass-marketed bracelets that
emit a high-pitched whine whenever the wearer surpasses a certain level of agitation.
These devices function not simply by encouraging the expulsion of unproductive emo-
tions such as anger, but by precisely domesticating these states of sudden and unfore-
seen fluctuation, assigning them a readily identifiable and repeatable sign.
8. All translations of Cohen’s text are my own.
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9. The Spanish oído refers to an “inner ear,” in contrast to oreja as outer ear or auricle.
Nonetheless, the thematics put into play by this inner ear (including questions of hear-
ing and attunement) also clearly resonate with the anato-physiological structure of the
ear, which acts as a conduit and/or limit between inside and outside.
10. A thematic reading of the story would support this conclusion. Likewise, the narrator
Lino and his girlfriend Clarissa are marked in their own ways by the experience of dic-
tatorship. Both of these contexts point to certain events that emphatically mark a limit
for responsibility and witnessing.
11. Allow me to clarify parenthetically what I mean (and do not mean) by a “tragic
endeavor.” I am using “the tragic” in a modal sense, rather than a generic or periodic
sense, to describe a way of thinking and feeling that informs various literary genres and
periods. Hegel’s interest in tragedy as an exemplar of the dialectic can provide a point
of departure, albeit one that Blanchot obliges us to move beyond. For Hegel, tragedy
both illustrates Spirit’s wont to split itself in twain and go against itself, and likewise
inaugurates the promise of reconciliation, or of making meaningful an event that oth-
erwise exceeds our understanding. But the dialectical notions of catastrophe and rec-
onciliation do not suffice for thinking what is at stake in Blanchot’s meditations on the
literary. It would be necessary here to turn to that other thinker of German Idealism,
Friedrich Hölderlin. In his essays and translations of Greek tragedy, Hölderlin reads the
tragic as marking a rupture in the dialectic itself. It is not my intention to privilege one
or the other of these views, but rather to situate the tragic between the thoughts of rec-
onciliation and rupture. Lastly, I am not claiming for Blanchot’s argument that the
tragic provides the ultimate meaning for all literature. It offers one model, and one that
is always already differing from itself, at that. I discuss these ideas in greater detail in
my forthcoming book (Dove 2004).
12. I take these questions to be central to the work of Nelly Richard, who has been criti-
cized for reifying the notion of transition (which she consistently refers to as “la
Transición”). It seems to me that, far from falling into the trap of idealization as her
critics claim, what Richard is actually doing is attempting to think of the transition as
a material event. This “materiality,” however, is not the same kind of materiality used
to designate a concrete world that lies beyond language and discourse.
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